The majority of U. S. temporary help supply (THS) rms offer nominally free, unrestricted computer skills training, a practice inconsistent with the competitive model of training. I propose and test a model in which rms offer general training to induce self-selection and perform screening of worker ability. The model implies, and the data con rm, that rms providing training attract higher ability workers yet pay them lower wages after training. Thus, beyond providing spot market labor, THS rms sell information about worker quality to their clients. The rapid growth of THS employment suggests that demand for worker screening is rising.
INTRODUCTION
Open the help wanted pages of a local newspaper, and you are likely to nd prominent advertisements from temporary help supply (THS) rms offering free skills training in subjects such as word processing, data entry, and in some cases computer programming. Manpower, Inc., the nation's largest THS employer, estimates that it trains more than 100,000 temporaries per year in the use of of ce automation software. The Bureau of Labor Statistics's (BLS) 1994 Occupational Compensation Survey (OCS) of Temporary Help Supply Services found that 89 percent of temporary workers are employed by establishments that provide some form of nominally free skills training. While not all workers train, a 1994 survey by the National Association of Temporary and Staf ng Services (NATSS) found that almost one quarter of current THS workers had received skills training as temporaries [Steinberg 1994 ]. Training stints are normally brief but not uniformly so. Close to half of those trained received eleven plus hours of training, and a third received more than twenty hours. As Krueger [1993] reported and recent BLS analysis conrms [U. S. Department of Labor 1996], training is almost uni-* E-mail: dautor@mit.edu. The author is indebted to Daron Acemoglu, Gary Becker, Edward Glaeser, Thomas Kane, Lawrence Katz, Frank Levy, Richard Murnane, Douglas Staiger, and two anonymous referees for invaluable assistance. I thank the Bureau of Labor Statistics and especially Jordan Pfuntner and the staff of the Occupational Compensation Survey Program for facilitating generous access to the Occupational Compensation Survey used for the analysis. I gratefully acknowledge the numerous temporary help rm personnel who submitted to interviews and offered insights. versally given "up-front" with no explicit charge and no contractual requirement of past or continued employment.
While skills training expenditures by THS establishments are modest-estimated at 4 percent of the wages paid to trainees in 1995 and 8 percent in 1997-the puzzle they present to the competitive model of training merits investigation. 1 The Human Capital model of Becker [1964] predicts that rms will never bear the up-front cost of general skills training due to the threat of poaching or holdup. Recent theoretical work challenges this notion, however, and several empirical studies nd that workers who receive general training from their employers do not appear to pay the costs through lower training wages as the Becker model predicts. 2 Yet this evidence is far from de nitive. Most employer-sponsored training consists of both general and speci c components. Additionally, because workers with unobservably greater earnings potential are typically more likely to receive training, this will bias empirical analyses against nding that trainees earn less than their marginal product during training. 3 By contrast, the training provided by temporary help employers-primarily end user computer skills-is inherently general. Furthermore, because workers typically receive training up-front during unpaid hours prior to taking any paid assignments, productivity is inherently zero during the training period. It is therefore clear that that the direct, up-front costs of skills training, which include computer equipment, instructional materials, and training staff, are borne by THS rms. This paper asks why temporary help rms provide free general skills training. The answer it provides is that in addition to fostering human capital, training serves two complementary in-1. Industry estimates place training expenditures at $75 million in 1995 and $146 million in 1997 with an average cost per trainee of of $118 and $150, respectively [NATSS 1996b [NATSS , 1998 ]. Wage-bill share calculations assume that 24 percent of temporary workers receive training [Steinberg 1994 ].
2. Models advanced by Acemoglu and Pischke [1998, 1999] , Chang and Wang [1996] , and Katz and Ziderman [1990] indicate that if employers hold private information about worker ability or skills, they may fund general skills training up front and capture the returns ex post. Studies that present evidence consistent with these models include Bishop [1996] and Baron, Berger, and Black [1997] . In a similar vein, Loewenstein and Spletzer [1998] show that training in off-site vocational courses, which typically provide general skills training, increases wages with the current employer less than it increases wages with future employers.
3. Acemoglu and Pischke [1998] , Altonji and Spletzer [1991] and Bartel and Sicherman [1998] report that workers with higher skills as measured by standardized test scores are more likely to receive training, even conditional on education.
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS formational functions. One is to induce self-selection. Firms that offer training are able to differentially attract workers of greater unobserved ability. A second role is to facilitate worker screening. By tightly coupling worker training with worker skills testing, temporary help rms use training to privately screen the ability of workers whom they train. As the model below demonstrates, these dual purposes-self-selection and screening-are complementary. Without the ability to privately screen worker ability, rms would be unable to retain the high ability workers that they train and hence unable to capture the bene ts of training.
The key premise of the theoretical model is that training is more productive and therefore more valuable to high ability workers. Workers are assumed to have imperfect prior knowledge of their ability while employers cannot initially perceive ability but observe it through training. Because of the learning advantage possessed by high ability workers, rms are able to offer a package of training and initially lower wages that induces selfselection. Workers of high perceived ability choose rms offering training in expectation of wage gains in permanent employment, while low ability workers are deterred by lower wages and limited expected gains. Firms pro t from their training investment ex post via their short-run informational advantage about ability and thereby limited monopsony power.
The model further explores how rms will adjust wages and training to accommodate competitive pressure that dissipates these monopsony pro ts. At the imperfectly competitive equilibrium of the model, rms maximize pro ts by providing socially suboptimal quantities of training-where marginal social bene ts exceed marginal private costs. Accordingly, as competitive conditions tighten, rms optimally dissipate pro ts into additional training. And because competition tends to pin wages down ex post, wages and training rise in tandem. Since trainees earn less on average than nontrainees, the implication is that competition narrows the wedge between training and nontraining wages.
To test these precepts, the paper exploits a restricted access Bureau of Labor Statistics study of wages and training in the THS industry encompassing an estimated 19 percent of all THS establishments and 36 percent of all THS workers as of 1994. The model's three implications nd strong support. Wages are lower at rms offering training by a modest but statistically signi cant magnitude; heightened market competition, as measured by a Her ndahl index, substantially increases rms' propensity to offer free training; and, although training increases with market competition, the wage gap between training and nontraining rms contracts signi cantly. The paper draws two conclusions. First, the presence of private information in the labor market appears a viable explanation for why rms fund workers' general human capital investments. Second, the emerging role of THS as a labor market information broker appears something more than an outgrowth of employers' desire for exibility; it suggests that the demand for worker screening is rising. 4
I. THE TEMPORARY HELP SUPPLY INDUSTRY: CONTEXT AND TRAINING
The THS industry supplies its workers to client sites on an as-needed basis, charging the client an hourly fee that typically exceeds the wage paid to the THS worker by 35 to 65 percent [Autor, Levy, and Murnane 1999; ALM hereinafter] . Starting from a small base, THS employment grew rapidly throughout the 1990s, accounting for fully 10 percent of net U. S. employment growth over the decade. As of 2001, approximately 1 in 35 U. S. workers was an employee of Help Supply Services [SIC 7363], which is primarily composed of THS. Further, given turnover rates exceeding 350 percent [NATSS 1996a ], the industry's point in time employment is likely to substantially understate the number of workers who have contact with it annually.
A. Skills Training
Job skills required by THS rms (primarily clerical) were essentially static and training negligible until the proliferation of workplace computing technology generated demand for new and rapidly shifting expertise that could be mastered quickly [Oberle 1990 ]. As is documented in Table I , training is now a pervasive industry feature. Of 1002 U. S. THS establishments surveyed by 4. Autor [2000a] and Miles [2001] provide evidence that the development of unjust dismissal doctrine during the 1980s, which raised employer risks in terminating workers, contributed substantially to increased demand for employment screening through THS. Recent changes in the organization of production may have also increased the returns to selectivity in hiring [Acemoglu 1999; Cappelli and Wilk 1997; Levy and Murnane 1996] .
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in 1994, 78 percent offered some form of skills training, and 65 percent provided computer skills training. 5 5. Computerized tutorials are the most common form of instruction (82 percent), while 52 percent of establishments provide workbook exercises and 45 percent provide classroom-based training. As documented in Table I, rms employ   TABLE I  SKILLS TRAINING: PREVALENCE AND POLICIES AT U. S. TEMPORARY HELP SUPPLY  ESTABLISHMENTS, 1994 Training provided White-collar occupations are professional specialty, technical, and executive and managerial. Clerical/sales occupations are marketing, sales, and clerical and administrative support. Blue-collar occupations are precision production, craft and repair, machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors, transportation and material movement occupations, and handlers, equipment cleaners, and laborers. The sample includes 1002 temporary establishments supplying white-collar, clerical, or blue-collar temporary workers (establishments may supply more than one type of worker). Training statistics by collar include only the subsample of rms supplying workers in collar (n 5 630, 859, and 755 for establishments supplying white-collar, clerical, and blue-collar workers, respectively). All frequencies are weighted by BLS national establishment sampling weights. Almost without exception, training is given prior to or between assignments during unpaid hours with all xed and marginal costs paid by the THS rm. ALM report that 44 percent of all skills training is given "up front" to allow workers to qualify for their rst assignments. Trainees are not contractually bound to take or retain a job assignment afterwards, nor would such a contract be enforceable. While THS rms are prone to overstate the ef cacy and depth of their training, evidence of its value is found in the fact that several leading rms sell the same training software and courses to corporate customers that they provide for free to their workers. For example, Manpower, Inc. charged $150 per worker per day to provide on-site training to approximately 35,000 of its clients' nontemporary workers in both 1996 and 1997. 6 These facts run counter to the Human Capital model of training [Becker 1964 ]. In the competitive case analyzed by Becker, workers pay for general skills training by accepting a wage below their marginal product during training. The threat of poaching or holdup ensures that workers earn their full posttraining marginal product, and hence up-front general skills training is not provided. By contrast, THS rms routinely provide training up front during unpaid hours, and hence the opportunity for workers to defray costs through a contemporaneously lower training wage is essentially nonexistent.
While several alternative explanations for these facts are conceivable within the standard framework-including skill-speci city, labor market monopsony, and low rates of worker turnover-none appears relevant. On the rst point, if skills provided are rmspeci c and hence (by de nition) have no outside market value, rms may invest in training up front and reap returns ex post. Yet, logically, THS rms must (and do) train in general skills broadly demanded by their many clients. Limited worker mobility after several training policies: managers select trainees (44 percent), clients request and fund training (46 percent), and, most prevalently, all volunteers are trained (85 percent). Since policies are not mutually exclusive, one might assume that more restrictive policies are applied to more valuable forms of training (e.g., computer skills training). Yet, among establishments that provide computer training exclusively and report only one training policy, 62 percent provide strictly up-front training. Nor is up-front computer training exclusively provided using the lowest cost methods. Among rms that offer exclusively up-front computer skills training, 25 percent provide classroom training. Hence, it appears that the bulk of computer training (both classroom and self-paced) is given on an up-front basis.
6. Personal communication, Sharon Canter, Director of Strategic Communications, Manpower, Inc., 1998. training might also make up-front training pro table, for example, if THS rms effectively operated "company towns." Yet THS markets are generally not concentrated in a conventional sense, with most localities served by multiple rms. Finally, it is a common assumption in the literature that low employee turnover facilitates employer-sponsored general skills training since workers are unlikely to depart after training [Blinder and Krueger 1996; OECD 1993] . If this argument is correct, then THS establishments-where annual turnover averages several hundred percent-are an improbable venue for training.
B. Skills Training: Industry Motivations
THS managers interviewed for this research primarily cited three motivations for providing skills training: worker recruitment, worker screening, and skill development. I discuss these in turn. 7 Because turnover is high, recruiting at THS establishments is ongoing. Applicants to THS rms are heterogeneous, often having short work histories, limited credentials, and recent spells of unemployment [Houseman and Polivka 2000; Segal and Sullivan 1997a] . While THS rms offer a variety of bene ts to attract workers, training is distinct among them because it is thought to differentially attract desirable workers. For example, a Manpower, Inc. advertisement to customers reads, "Manpower offers our employees many ongoing training opportunities-at no charge. This helps them increase their marketability and wage earning potential. Plus, it helps Manpower and Manpower Technical continue to attract and retain the best workers." The view embodied here that training is more valuable to higher ability workers concords with numerous ndings cited earlier that suggest that training and worker ability are complements.
Closely related to the recruiting function is the idea that skills training facilitates worker assessment. For example, the industry trade association's guide How to Buy Temporary Help/ Staf ng Services [NATSS undated] offers this advice to client rms, "How are potential temporary employees screened and tested? Does the company offer any training programs? This may help you determine the "quality" of workers you receive." This 7. Interviews were conducted with approximately two dozen THS executives. Additional eldwork included performing site visits to THS rms, undergoing skills training and testing with software and materials provided by various rms, registering as a THS worker, and conducting a national survey of THS establishments (analyzed in Autor, Levy, and Murnane [1999] ).
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screening role has three components: pretraining exams measure the skills that workers possess; tests before and after training permit rms to gauge workers' ability to acquire new skills; and workers' motivation to take training is itself considered an emblem of skill or desirability. 8 A nal motivation for training is of course skill development. While in theory training could serve only a signaling role as in Spence [1973] , the evidence cited above suggests that workers do gain marketable skills from the training experience. 9
C. Salient Institutional Features
In addition to skills training, several institutional features of the THS industry bear emphasis. A rst is labor supply. Survey data reveal that a large majority of THS workers would prefer a traditional (non-THS) employment relationship and hence use THS to search for permanent work or to supplement income during job search [Cohany 1996 [Cohany , 1998 Steinberg 1994 Steinberg , 1998 ]. Consistent with these motivations, 58 percent of workers exit the sector within a single calendar quarter, and 83 percent within two quarters [Segal and Sullivan 1997b] .
Since most THS workers are job seekers, a second salient institutional feature is that THS rms hold a comparative advantage in facilitating arm's length worker screening. Because the availability and duration of THS assignments is inherently uncertain, THS arrangements provide clients with a means to audition workers for permanent employment at low cost and minimal legal risk [Autor 2000a ]. THS rms rarely need to re workers on behalf of their clients. Instead, THS rms simply do not provide additional assignments to workers who fail initial screens or perform poorly at client sites.
While employers have historically used THS to meet short-term labor needs, the importance of employment screening has grown. Houseman [1997] reports that among employers increasing their use of THS, 37 percent cite dif culty nding quali ed workers, and 8. In all cases the author observed, training began and ended with assessment. Firms can of course test without training, and some do. This is unlikely to be as informative, however, because testing will not normally gauge motivation or learning ability. 9. It is also important to observe that the THS market is characterized by vertical (quality) differentiation, with competing rms offering differing packages of cost and service. For example, an article in Purchasing states [Evans-Correia 1991] : "most buyers agree that testing and training do make a more reliable worker . . . Businesses will have to pay a premium for temporaries with extensive testing and training. But . . .'it's worth it.' " 1416 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 24 percent cite screening candidates for permanent employment as important motivations. Consistent with these facts, direct ows from THS into permanent employment are substantial. ALM nd that between 11 and 18 percent of THS workers placed on assignment in a calendar month are directly hired by clients.
The model below re ects each of these institutional features. In the model, workers supply labor inelastically to the THS sector for a brief period during which time they are screened and subsequently hired by clients.
II. MODEL
A. Environment
This section offers a model of training provision in which rms offer general skills training to induce self-selection and perform subsequent screening of worker ability. The model builds on Salop and Salop [1976] , Greenwald [1986] , and Acemoglu and Pischke [1998, 1999; AP hereinafter] . Similarities with these models are discussed below. For the reader's convenience, I follow the notation and exposition in AP where possible. Each of the three empirical implications derived and tested below is unique to the current model.
The model has three periods. There are a large number of THS rms, some of which offer skills training, and some of which do not. I refer to these as training and nontraining rms. All rms and workers are risk neutral, and there is no discounting between periods. In the rst period, workers may select to work at either a training or nontraining rm. Training rms provide general skills training t to the workers whom they hire during the rst period. Nontraining rms do not.
At the end of the rst period, a fraction l of the workers at each THS rm quits for exogenous reasons to enter the secondhand market. In addition, workers may quit their rst period THS rms voluntarily to enter the secondhand market. Workers in the secondhand market are hired by other THS rms. At the beginning of the third period, all workers are hired by clients into the permanent sector.
Workers produce nothing during the rst period. In the second period and third period, each worker produces
where h is the general ability of the worker. This multiplicative speci cation embeds a key assumption of the model: ability and general skills training are complements. 10 The cost for each worker trained is c(t ), which is incurred by the rm. The cost function is assumed to be everywhere strictly increasing, convex and differentiable with c(0) 5 0, c9 [ . 0, c0 [ . 0, and lim t ®`c 9 (t ) 5`. This cost structure ensures that some training is socially optimal for high ability workers.
Workers may be of either two abilities, h [ {H,L}, where without loss of generality, I normalize H 5 1 and L 5 0. The distribution of worker ability is given by the parameter r which is the fraction of low ability workers in the population.
The distribution from which worker ability is drawn is common knowledge, but neither rms nor workers know the ability of any individual in the rst period. At the start of the rst period, however, each worker receives an imperfectly informative signal of his or her ability, b , which I refer to as the worker's beliefs. This signal may be either high or low. The probability that a worker is of a given ability conditional on his beliefs is P(h 5 Hu b 5 h) 5 d h and P(h 5 Hu b 5 l ) 5 d l . The following inequality indicates that workers' beliefs are informative: 1 . d h . 1 2 r . d l . 0. A worker with high beliefs is more likely than the average worker to be of high ability, and vice versa for low belief workers.
Although rms cannot initially distinguish worker ability, they are able to observe it during training. If a rm trains in period 1, it privately observes the ability of each trainee; otherwise, not. The amount of training given to each worker is public knowledge. However, information acquired by rms about worker ability is held privately through the second period. At the end of the second period, each worker's ability becomes common knowledge.
The exact sequence of events in the model is as follows: 1. At the start of period 1, workers form beliefs about their ability based on the signal, b , that they privately receive. Each rm offers a package of training, t , and a rst-period wage, w 1 $ 0. Each worker then selects to apply to either a training or nontraining rm. 2. Firms hire all workers who apply. At this point, rms do not know the ability of any worker they have hired. 3. During training, rms learn the ability of each worker 10. Any concave function with positive cross-partial derivatives between training and ability would work equally well.
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS whom they have trained. Firms that do not train do not learn the ability of any worker. 4. At the end of the rst period, a fraction l of each rm's workforce separates for exogenous reasons to enter the secondhand market. Incumbent rms offer remaining workers a second period wage w 2 . At training rms, this wage may differ between high and low ability workers. The wage will not be contingent upon output, however; if a worker stays with the incumbent rm, the worker receives the speci ed wage in the second period. 11 After receiving the incumbent rm's wage offer, workers may quit to enter the secondhand market. 5. At the start of the second period, outside THS rms may make wage offers v(t ) to workers in the secondhand market. Because training provided is public knowledge, the secondhand wage may depend upon training received. 12 6. Workers are deployed to client sites in period 2 where they produce output according to (1). At the end of the second period, each worker's ability becomes public knowledge. 7. At the start of the third period, all workers are hired by clients into the permanent sector and again produce output according to (1). Depending on parameter values, the model can generate several equilibria. The equilibrium of empirical relevance, analyzed below, is a separating equilibrium in which workers with high ability beliefs self-select to receive training while those with low beliefs do not. To simplify the exposition, I rst explore a setting in which training and nontraining rms do not earn equal pro ts. After deriving the conditions for a separating equilibrium, I generalize the model to explore how free entry and hence equalized pro ts impact training and wages.
B. Equilibrium with Restricted Entry
To obtain the necessary conditions for the separating equilibrium, I work backward from the nal (third) period. It is immediate that because worker ability and training provided are 11. In the case of contingent output contracts, the model would be trivial. Firms would simply offer output contracts of epsilon length to measure worker ability. Private information would be irrelevant.
12. For simplicity, I rule out the possibility of raids in which rms attempt to bid away workers who are not in the secondhand market. It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium is robust to this generalization.
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common knowledge in the third period, third period wages will be set competitively: w 3 5 h i (1 1 t i ).
To retain workers in the second period, incumbent rms must pay them at least what they can earn in the secondhand market. Period 2 wages will accordingly be set by wages offered to separators. Denote the expected productivity of separators as v(t ), equal to the product of their expected ability and the training they have received:
The value of (2) will differ by rm type (training or nontraining). At the separating equilibrium, the worker pool of training rms is composed exclusively of high belief workers. Although as noted above, a fraction of the high belief pool, (1 2 d h ), is of low ability, each worker is offered the same training since rms cannot initially distinguish ability. At the end of period 1, training rms lose a fraction l of their workers to exogenous turnover. Training rms will then use their private information about ability acquired during training to set period 2 wages. Workers of low ability are offered a wage of zero, their revealed productivity. Because some high ability workers have turned over exogenously, all low ability workers will also separate to pool with the exogenous departures. Substituting into (2), the expected productivity and hence the outside wage for separators from training rms is
This equation has four implications. First, because the secondhand pool is a mixture of exogenous departures of expected ability d h and endogenous departures of low ability (h 5 0), the expected productivity of trainees in the secondhand market is strictly below the expected productivity of the average trainee. Hence, the secondhand pool is characterized by adverse selection.
Second, although some separators from training rms are of high ability, all workers in the secondhand market command a wage of only v(t ). This follows because outside buyers cannot distinguish individual ability and individual workers cannot credibly communicate the reason they separated from their rst period rm (i.e., all would claim to be exogenous separators). Accordingly, rms in the secondhand market offer each worker the expected productivity of the entire pool, v(t ).
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A third implication of (3) is that to retain high ability workers trained during period 1, incumbent rms need only pay them a wage of w 2 (t ) 5 v(t ), strictly below their actual productivity. This result is due to the private information that training rms hold about worker ability and hence limited monopsony power. Although training rms recognize which of their workers are high ability, rms in the secondhand market do not. The opportunity wage of high ability workers trained during the rst period is therefore v(t ). This result exploits Greenwald's [1986] insight that incumbent employers' informational advantage about worker ability generates adverse selection in the secondhand market, thereby depressing outside wages.
A nal implication of (3) is that training provided during the rst period increases trainees' productivity by more than it increases their period 2 wages. This can be seen by observing that
Although all training rm separators in the secondhand market have received training, a disproportionate share are low ability workers who do not bene t from training. By contrast, all workers retained by training rms are of high ability. Equation (3) therefore implies that rms are able to increase the gap between retained workers' productivity and their outside wage through training.
Solving for training rms' optimal period 1 training level given this wage structure is straightforward. A client's willingness to pay for workers supplied by a given rm during period 2 is simply the expected productivity of workers who are retained:
(1 1 t ). Training rms choose wages and training t * to maximize pro ts, and the rst-order condition is
This condition will be satis ed at t * . 0. Although rms incur training costs up front in the rst period, they are able to earn positive pro ts in the second period by capitalizing on their informational advantage about ability developed through training. Hence, as AP explore in greater detail, because training increases workers' productivity by more than it raises their outside wages, rms nd it pro table to pay for general skills training. At the separating equilibrium, the worker pool of nontraining rms is comprised exclusively of low belief workers. Given that a fraction d l of these workers is of high ability, it is possible that nontraining rms would also nd it pro table to train. To simplify the analysis, I assume that the marginal cost of the rst unit 1421 WHY DO TEMP HELP FIRMS PROVIDE TRAINING? of training is strictly positive such that c9 (0) . (1 2 l )d l (1 2 v9 (0)). This structure implies that the gains to training the small fraction of high ability workers in the low belief pool does not offset the losses incurred by training the remainder. 13 At the end of period 1, a fraction l of the workers at nontraining rms turns over exogenously and enters the secondhand market. Because these workers are a representative subset of the initial pool and have not received training, it follows that their secondhand wage is v(0) 5 d l . Hence, incumbent nontraining rms pay their workers w 2 (0) 5 v(0) to retain them.
C. Separating Condition
A key result of the information structure visible from (3) is that high ability trainees receive less than their marginal product during period 2. How much less? A comparison of v(t *) and v(0) reveals that period 2 wages at training rms may well be lower than at nontraining rms, even though ability and training are both higher. This result follows from the fact that it is not productivity that sets wages at training rms but rather the degree of adverse selection in the outside market as seen in (3).
Since period 1 wages are identically zero for trainees and nontrainees and expected period 3 wages are higher for trainees, all workers would self-select to receive training unless v(t *) , v(0). Observe, however, that although all workers would forgo some earnings to receive training, workers with high beliefs will forgo more because their expected period 3 gains are larger (d h . d l ). Accordingly, the necessary and suf cient condition for worker separation is simply
At a separating equilibrium, the expected period 3 wage gain for high belief workers offsets at a minimum their training wage penalty in period 2, while for low ability belief workers it does not. Note that this equation is not satis ed at all parameter values. 1 4 I focus here on the case where (5) is satis ed; a separating equilibrium holds. A necessary implication of (5), tested below, is 13. In this expression, v9 (0) 5 l d /(l d l 1 (1 2 d l )). This expression is comparable to (3) except that d l replaces d h to re ect the expected ability of low belief workers.
14. When it is not satis ed, the model generally yields a pooling equilibrium, discussed further in Autor [2000b] .
1422
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS that v(0) 2 v(t *) . 0. At a separating equilibrium, wages at training rms are lower than at nontraining rms. 15 The separating equilibrium given by (5) depends critically upon two features of the model. A rst is the complementarity between training and ability. Because training and ability are complements, high belief workers apply to training rms, and low belief workers apply to nontraining rms. Training therefore serves as a selfselection device as in Salop and Salop [1976] . If training and ability were not complements, either all workers or no workers would choose training. A separating equilibrium would be infeasible.
The second critical feature of the model is that training elicits private information about worker ability. If training rms did not acquire private information about worker ability, competitive markets would ensure, as Becker [1964] observed, that each trainee received his marginal product after training. And since trainees are on average more productive than nontrainees, (5) could not be satis ed, and training would not be provided. 16 Hence, the dual roles played by training in the model-self-selection and information acquisition-are complementary. By inducing self-selection of high ability workers, training improves the rm's worker pool. By revealing private information about worker ability, training then allows the rm to pro t from this pool.
While the model is of course stylized, these private-information-based results appear consistent with the personnel policies of THS rms. After initial training and testing, THS workers are normally rst placed at lower wage, lower skill assignments and subsequently given better placements as they demonstrate success. Workers who test and train successfully and perform well at assignments advance more rapidly while workers who perform poorly are rarely offered placements. Consequently, poor workers 15. Note that this equilibrium satis es the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps [1987] . A question not addressed explicitly by the model is whether workers could apply to multiple temporary help rms, receive training from each, and then conditional on being high ability, induce a bidding war among rms to raise their wages to their actual productivity. Implicitly, the timing of the model rules out this case since workers must remain at one rm to receive training during period 1. In practice, the case of multiple temporary help rm registrations does not appear particularly important. Segal and Sullivan [1997b, Table 3 ] report that only one in eight THS workers holds positions from more than one THS rm. THS managers interviewed explained that because workers receive superior assignments as they demonstrate success, it behooves them to take assignments primarily from a single rm.
16. Note that satisfaction of (5) is suf cient but not necessary for training. A necessary condition for training is that trainees do not receive their marginal product after training. See Autor [2000b] .
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disproportionatel y turn over while good workers frequently remain. Hence, there is little question that incumbent THS employers develop a better informational position regarding worker ability than do outside buyers.
D. Equilibrium: The Impact of Competition on Training and Wages
At present, these results are a partial equilibrium inasmuch as training rms earn monopsony pro ts while nontraining rms do not. Here, I brie y explore how rms may adjust wages and training to accommodate competitive pressure that equalize and dissipate these monopsony pro ts.
Let the parameter p $ 0 equal the minimum per-worker pro t or "markup" demanded by each incumbent or entrant THS rm. 1 7 Assume as above that there are a large number of training and nontraining rms and that (5) is satis ed; i.e., the separating equilibrium holds. Competition will ensure that per-worker profits are reduced to p at each rm and further that all rms of a given type employ the same wage and training policies. An important maintained assumption is that while competition dissipates rents arising from asymmetric information, it does not dispel asymmetric information directly since rms must continue to test and train to observe ability. 1 8 De ne V(t ,p ) as the maximum wage a rm is willing to pay as a function of a worker's training and the rm's reservation pro t. At nontraining rms, the minimum pro t requirement is simply re ected in a debit to the wage:
This wage, equal to the expected productivity of separators in the secondhand market minus the markup, generates pro ts equal to the pro t oor.
17. This reservation pro t parameter may arise in several contexts, for example from a xed cost of market entry that serves as a pro t oor as in Salop [1979] or from Cournot competition among market incumbents (cf. Tirole [1988, section 5.5] ). In the empirical work ahead, I use a Her ndahl index to proxy market conditions and hence either interpretation is natural. More generally, rms facing a constant elasticity of labor supply will optimally set wages at a productivity-cost markdown inversely proportional to this elasticity. If, plausibly, added market competition increases the elasticity of labor supply, rms will reduce their markdowns accordingly.
18. Since rms compete for both workers and clients, competition could arise in the product or labor market or both. I maintain the assumption that clients pay expected productivity and hence the locus of competition is the labor market.
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The wage for workers at training rms is similarly determined by the expected productivity of training rm separators minus the markup:
Notice that the pro t parameter enters the wage function twice: directly because, in equilibrium, rms hiring separators must receive the reservation pro t; and indirectly, because the training level t (p ) will optimally depend upon p . Whereas training rms previously chose the training level via an unconstrained pro t maximization, they now choose training to maximize worker utility (i.e., the sum of workers' wages over three periods) subject to the minimum pro t constraint p . 19 Substituting (7) into the worker's utility function gives the rm's maximization:
Solving for t (p ), the rm's optimal training choice given p , yields the following expression for training as a function of reservation pro ts and worker ability: 20
This equation provides two key empirical implications. The rst is that competition increases training. This can be seen by taking the derivative of training with respect to the pro t parameter, 19 . Observe that if a rm failed to maximize worker utility for a given pro t level, a competitor-also making pro ts p but offering a preferred combination of wages and training-would attract all high ability belief workers. 20. The working paper version of this manuscript [Autor 2000b ] derives a more complicated expression for c(t (p )), equal to the minimum of (9) and the socially optimal level of training, t **. Because the case in which (9) exceeds the socially optimal level of training is unlikely, I suppress it in the exposition. Equations (9)-(11) assume that c(t (p )) # t **.
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where c9 (t *) is given by (4). This derivative is negative; a fall in p (i.e., more competition) raises training.
The second empirical implication is that competition increases wages at training rms by more than at nontraining rms. At nontraining rms, competition increases wages one-forone; a reduction in the markup yields an equivalent increase in the wage (] V(0,p )/] p 5 2 1). At training rms, however, competition increases wages through two channels: directly through a fall in p , and indirectly through an increase in t (p ). Hence, competition increases wages at training rms by more than one-for-one:
Recall, however, that in the separating equilibrium, wages at training rms are below those of nontraining rms. The predicted effect of competition is therefore to narrow the wedge between training and nontraining wages. The intuition for these two comparative static results is visible in Figure I which plots the marginal cost of skills training against the marginal gain to revenue. This gain is apportioned between worker wages and rm pro ts according to the adverse selection condition set by (3). At the imperfectly competitive equilibrium of the model, rms maximize pro ts by providing socially suboptimal training, where marginal social bene ts exceed marginal private costs. This is depicted as point t * in the gure. Now consider a case where in response to competition, a training rm wishes to increase workers' earnings by the area A-B-C-D. One response is to pay A-B-C-D out of pro ts. Alternatively, the rm can increase training from t * to t **, thereby raising earnings equivalently but at cost A-C-D, which is strictly less than A-B-C-D. Accordingly, as competitive conditions tighten, rms will optimally dissipate pro ts into additional training. 2 1 And because competition in the secondhand market pins down the wage ex post, wages and training rise in tandem. 21 . It can be shown by an application of the envelope theorem that at t *, the net cost of increasing wages slightly through additional training is zero.
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To close the model, note nally that rst period wages at training rms will generally be equal to zero. Although training rms could elect to pass pro ts through into rst period wages rather than into training, Figure I indicates why this case is unlikely to occur. 22
E. Empirical Implications
In the subsequent sections, I test the three key predictions of the model: 1) that wages (for comparable jobs) are lower at training rms than at nontraining rms, a necessary condition for training to generate self-selection by worker ability; 2) that rms provide more free skills training as market competition increases; and 3) that wage gains spurred by competition are comparatively larger for workers at training than at nontraining rms. Each of these theoretical predictions receives empirical support. I also discuss alternative interpretations and provide supplementary evidence using survey data from ALM. 
III. DATA SOURCES
The BLS Occupational Compensation Survey of Temporary Help Supply Services (OCS hereafter) provides a unique data source for analyzing the relationships among wages, training, and competition at temporary help establishments. Conducted in 1994, the survey enumerates employment, wages, training offerings, and training policies at 1033 temporary help establishments in 104 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSAs), or nonmetropolitan counties throughout the United States (which, for brevity, are referred to as MSAs). An establishment is de ned as all outlets of a rm in an MSA and may encompass multiple of ces. Thirty-eight percent of establishments belong to rms residing in multiple regions. The sample comprises an estimated 19 percent of all THS establishments employing twenty or more temporary workers in 1994 and 34 percent of all THS employment. 23 Surveyed establishments provided data for a payroll reference month on the hourly wage of assigned THS workers classi ed into 47 detailed technical, clerical, blue-collar, and service occupations. For brevity, I refer to the rst three of these groups as white-collar, clerical/ sales, and blue-collar, respectively. Service occupations (3.9 percent of the sample) were excluded from the analysis because they do not normally receive training, as were observations where occupation was unspeci ed, leaving 333,888 observations at 1002 establishments. 24 In addition to wages and job titles, the primary component of the survey used below is detailed information collected on skills training subjects and policies summarized in Table I . Respondents reported whether they offer skills training to each "collar" in eight subject categories: word processing, data entry, computer programming languages, workplace rules and on-the-job conduct, customer service skills, interview and resume development skills, communications skills, and other. I focus here on computer skills 23. Franchises of a rm are counted as independent establishments. The mean number of establishments owned by multiregion rms is 7.9 with a standard deviation of 14.2. Con dentiality requirements prevent disclosure of the range of establishments owned by multiregion rms. The survey universe includes only establishments with twenty plus workers. It is likely that establishments with fewer workers provide a negligible share of THS employment.
24. Inclusion of service occupations changes none of the substantive results. White-collar occupations include professional specialty, technical occupations, accountants and executive, administrative, and managerial occupations. Clerical occupations include marketing, sales, and clerical and administrative support occupations. Blue-collar occupations include precision production, craft and repair, machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors, transportation and material movement occupations, and helpers, handlers, and equipment cleaners. See BLS (1996) for corresponding SIC codes and job descriptions.
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Training policies were categorized as follows: all workers receive some training; workers volunteer; establishment selects workers for training; and clients request and pay for training. Multiple responses were permitted. Unlike the training subject data, these policies refer to the entire establishment rather than workers in a collar. If a rm speci es multiple training policies, it cannot normally be determined which policy applies to what subjects or worker groups. For purposes of the empirical work, I combine the "all workers trained" category with the "workers volunteer" category into an "all/volunteers" category because it is apparent that many establishments that report training all workers actually train all workers who volunteer. Since the majority (62 percent) of rms that checked the "all" category also checked the "volunteers" category, this decision had little impact on the substantive results. Firms that did not report any training subjects (or only reported "other") were coded as nontraining rms, and rms that offered training only to a speci c collar(s) were coded as nontraining rms for the collar(s) that they do not train. 25 
IV. ARE WAGES LOWER AT ESTABLISHMENTS THAT OFFER TRAINING?
A. Wage Differentials between Training and Nontraining Establishments
For up-front skills training to induce self-selection by ability, wages at training rms must be lower than at nontraining rms. 25. Hence, for example, if a rm had a "client requests/pays" policy and offered exclusively word processing skills to clerical workers, it would be coded as having a "no training" policy for white-and blue-collar workers.
26. Two sets of BLS supplied probability sampling weights, national and area (MSA), are used for the analysis. Wage models use national weights to approximate the U. S. THS wage distribution while models of the relationship between THS market concentration and skills training or wages use area weights since the MSA is hypothesized as the relevant market. For some analyses, I also employ regional and occupational employment data from the 1994 Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group les and the Census 1990 IPUMS 1 percent sample [Ruggles and Sobeck et al. 1997 ]. All CPS and Census data are weighted by sampling weights.
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Before turning to regression estimates, Table II provides a bivariate comparison of mean log wages at training and nontraining establishments in the nine major occupational groups in the sample (three in white-collar, two in clerical/sales, four in bluecollar). The comparison is striking. In eight of nine occupations, mean wages are lower at training establishments, with an average occupational wage difference of minus 6.4 log points.
To make a more formal comparison, I estimate the following equation:
where W i j is the natural logarithm of hourly wages of individual (i) at establishment ( j). T j is a vector of establishment training variables, E j is a vector of establishment characteristics, O i is a vector of major occupation indicators corresponding to the categories in Table II , R j is a vector of 103 MSA indicators, and e i j is a random error term assumed to be composed of a person-speci c and establishment-speci c component. Given this error structure, (12) is estimated with Huber-White standard errors that allow for clustering at establishments. The parameter of interest is d , the wage differential at training establishments. Due to the inclusion of narrow MSA and occupation indicators, d effectively measures wage differentials among local THS establishments potentially competing for the same workers and supplying labor to the same customers. The rst three columns of Table III presents wage models for the full sample. The initial speci cation estimates the training wage differential with an indicator variable that is equal to one if the establishment provides computer skills training. The coefcient on this variable indicates that wages at training establishments are on average 2.0 log points lower, which is signi cant at the 5 percent level.
To probe alternative explanations for this wage differential, the second column introduces two additional controls. The rst is the log of establishment size. Because large establishments typically provide more consistent THS assignments, workers at these establishments may accept lower hourly wages. And since large establishments are substantially more likely to offer training, it is plausible that the observed training-wage relationship in part re ects a size-wage differential. The second control introduced is the log of THS employment in the major occupation ("collar") in the MSA. This variable may proxy for market scale effects that 1430 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS are correlated with both wages and skills training. 27 As column (2) indicates, wages are relatively lower at larger THS establishments and are signi cantly higher in MSAs where the scale of 27. Establishment size is measured by survey reference month employment within-collar at each establishment. An establishment is coded as supplying labor in a collar if workers were employed in that collar during the survey reference month. It is likely that some establishments provide workers in collars not present during the survey month. Market size is measured by survey reference month MSA-collar THS employment. 
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THS employment is relatively greater. Notably, inclusion of these measures has little impact on the training wage differential.
The nal speci cation in Panel A allows the establishment wage differentials to vary by training policy. The wage differential for the up-front training policy is estimated at 2 2.5 log points, which is highly signi cant. By contrast, the "client requests" and " rm selects" policy coef cients are close to zero and insigni cant. Hence, the negative wage impact of employment at a training establishment is exclusively accounted for by the up-front training policy.
Since workers receive training during nonwork hours, the wage differentials estimated above do not re ect "training wages" in the conventional sense of Becker [1964] . Rather, they indicate that workers at establishments providing up-front training receive lower wages while assigned to client sites, either before or after they have received training (or both). ,888 333,888 333,888 201,314 201,314 201,314 All models are weighted by OCS national establishmen t probability weights and include 103 metropolitan statistical area (MSA) dummies and 8 major occupation dummies. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the establishmen t level (1002 establishments). Fixed effect models are limited to workers employed at multiregion rms (50 rms and 395 establishments) . Training policies are not mutually exclusive.
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A potential concern with these estimates is that establishments providing up-front training might pay lower wages in part because of other amenities offered or due to unobserved (negative) quality differences that are correlated with training provision. One can partially explore this concern by exploiting an unusual feature of the OCS data. As noted above, 38 percent of sampled establishments belong to multiregion rms, many of which do not offer uniform training across establishments. This within-rm variation permits inclusion of xed effects that remove each rm's mean wage "policy," thereby controlling for differences in quality or amenities prevailing rmwide. Accordingly, the xed effects models identify average occupational pay differentials across training and nontraining establishments belonging to the same rm.
To perform these estimates, I limit the sample to workers of multiregion establishments, leaving 50 rms, 395 establishments, and 201,314 worker observations. Panel B of Table III presents the xed effects estimates. In the single training indicator speci cation augmented with rm xed effects, the point estimate for the training wage differential is 2 3.5 log points. Adding controls for establishment size and MSA-collar THS employment does not appreciably change this coef cient. When the wage impact of training is allowed to vary by training policy in column (3), it is again the up-front training policy that accounts for the negative training-wage relationship. Conditional on rm xed effects and detailed MSA and occupational controls, the up-front policy remains signi cantly negative at 2 4.9 log points. Apparently, even within individual rms, only those establishments offering unrestricted skills training pay lower wages than their local competitors. 28 Although unobserved negative selection on ability at training establishments could give rise to similar wage patterns, this does not appear likely. For example, ALM (Table 12 ) report that establishments offering skills training are substantially more selective in hiring THS workers than nontraining establishments. In 28. Wage differentials were also estimated separately by collar and by major occupation (nine total) using both pooled and xed effects models. These disaggregated results con rm that the negative training wage relationship is pervasive among blue-collar and clerical occupations, is driven by up-front training policies, and is comparable in magnitude to the pooled occupation results above. Whitecollar estimates generally nd an insigni cantly negative training-wage relationship. When training subject dummies (corresponding to the seven training areas) were included in the models, they were not as a group signi cant. Policy variables were robust to their inclusion. Further details and speci cation tests are available in Autor [2000b] . particular, holding occupation constant, training establishments are signi cantly more likely than nontraining establishments in the same MSAs to require a high school diploma (19 percent), previous experience (14 percent), previous training or skills certi cation (25 percent), and good English or verbal skills (15 percent). These facts suggest that unobserved selection works against a nding of a negative training-wage relationship.
C. The Costs and Bene ts of Training
It is important to ask whether these modest differentials are of an appropriate economic magnitude. According to sources cited above, industry training expenditures equaled 1.0 percent of the wage-bill in 1995, and 73 percent of workers were employed at establishments offering training. Together, these gures imply that training establishments would need to charge workers a wage differential of 1.4 percentage points to recover costs. This gure comports closely to estimated overall training wage differential of 2 2.0 log points in column (1) Table III. While this calculation is crude, it suggests that the wage differential workers receive at training establishments is at least roughly in line with the cost of training and hence may plausibly be compensated by subsequent wage gains.
To complete this argument, it would be valuable to directly estimate the wage gains that trainees receive upon leaving THS. While the OCS data do not permit such a test, survey data from ALM provide evidence on a closely related question: do workers at training establishments nd permanent placements with greater frequency than other THS workers? Since wages for THS workers typically increase by 10 to 20 percent upon entering permanent employment [Segal and Sullivan 1998 ], a greater hiring rate out of training establishments would indicate greater expected wage gains for trainees. THS establishments surveyed by ALM were asked the following question, "Of the workers [within the establishment's largest occupation category] who worked at an assignment last month, about what percentage were hired by a customer last month?" A regression of establishment responses on occupation main effects, MSA dummies, an indicator variable for whether or not the rm provides free training and an intercept yields the following estimate (standard errors are in parentheses): Given a base placement frequency of 10.5 percent at nontraining establishments, this estimate indicates that workers at training establishments are substantially (approximately 60 percent) more likely to nd a permanent placement through their THS employer in a given month. Hence, these data support the model's central implication that the wage pro le of workers at training rms is, on average, steeper. 29
V. THE IMPACT OF MARKET CONCENTRATION ON THE PREVALENCE OF SKILLS TRAINING
At the imperfectly competitive equilibrium of the model, rms maximize pro ts by providing training at socially suboptimal levels. The model therefore implies that as competitive conditions tighten, rms optimally dissipate pro ts into additional training. This implication contrasts with the Becker [1964] model where training levels are invariant to competitive conditions (because they are always at the social optimum).
The OCS data are well suited to testing how training provision responds to market conditions. The sample includes data on approximately 20 percent of the 1994 U. S. universe of THS establishments, with much greater coverage in larger MSAs. Additionally, the sampling weights implicitly provide complete information on the count and size distribution of rms not directly surveyed. Using the weights, one may calculate a Her ndahl concentration measure for each of the three major occupational collars (white-collar, clerical/ sales, and blue-collar) in each MSA:
29. Note that these differences in exit probabilities imply a 3.5 month shorter mean time to permanent employment at training establishments (9.5 months at nontraining establishments versus 6.0 months at training establishments). Assuming that non-THS wages average 10 percent above THS wages [Segal and Sullivan 1998 ], workers at training establishments can expect 2 percent greater total earnings over 9.5 months (including both THS and non-THS wages) than workers at nontraining establishments.
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where ( j) indexes occupational collars, (k) indexes MSAs, (i) indexes establishments within a region, E i j k is establishment occupational employment, v i k is the BLS area sampling probability weight for the establishment, and n k is the number of establishments in the MSA. 3 0
The calculation assumes that "collar" distributions at nonsampled establishments are comparable to those of sampled establishments and that MSAs constitute distinct THS markets. This latter assumption is clearly an approximation but is reasonable given that THS markets are by nature local, circumscribed by the distance THS workers are willing to commute to assignments. A complete measure of competition in the THS industry would also include factors such as the concentration of customers and the opportunity for direct hire of temporary workers by non-THS rms. While these measures are unfortunately not available, it is not obvious that their omission will introduce bias.
Summary characteristics of regional markets both overall and by collar are provided in Table IV . THS market concentration in sampled MSAs is on average moderate but varies signi cantly. Some of the smallest nonmetropolitan markets contain only a single establishment while the least concentrated MSAs have a Her ndahl of under 0.05.
A. Estimation
Using a cross-section regression to estimate the concentration-training relationship may be problematic since many local market factors may affect training such as the distribution of worker skills and preferences, demand by clients, regional price levels, etc. While one might locate proxies for some of these factors, this approach is unlikely to be convincing. An alternative strategy pursued here is to identify the concentration-training relationship using within-market variation in the relative concentration of white-collar, clerical/sales, and blue-collar occupations. Speci cally, I estimate the following model:
30. This equation is analogous to the textbook Her ndahl except that each sampled establishment's market share is de ated by the employment count at nonsampled establishments while the sum of squared market shares is in ated by the imputed shares of nonsampled establishments. An establishment's area weight is the ratio of sampled to unsampled establishments in the establishment's size class in an MSA.
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS where (i) denotes establishments, ( j) denotes occupational collars, and (k) denotes regions. T i j k is an indicator variable equal to one if an establishment offers training to workers in a given collar, H jk is the MSA-collar Her ndahl index from (14), C j is a vector of collar main effects, S i j is a vector of establishment occupation share variables within collars, E i j is establishmentcollar employment, M jk is MSA-collar THS employment, a is a common intercept, and e i j k is a random error term composed of establishment, MSA, and occupation-speci c components. 31 In addition, I include a vector of 103 MSA dummies, R k , to absorb unobserved factors common to occupations in each market that affect the overall propensity to train. The parameter s measures the direct impact of competition on training propensity. Because the Her ndahl measure increases with concentration, the predicted sign of s is negative.
Four computer skills training variables are used for the estimates: word processing, data entry, computer programming 31. Occupational share variables correspond to the nine major occupation groups. Two share variables are included for white-collar, one for clerical/sales, and three for blue-collar (where one share variable is omitted in each of the three collars). Variables sum to one within a collar. languages, and an any-computer-training aggregate. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, a nonlinear model would be appropriate but is impractical due to the large number of indicator variables in the equation. Accordingly, I estimate a linear probability model with Huber-White standard errors that account for clustering within MSA-collar cells and are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity. While the earlier results focused on training policies and not on training subjects, I focus on training subjects here for two reasons. First, the model's prediction is that rms vary their training provision in response to market competition while the policies that complement this training are invariant. Second and more pragmatically, the identi cation strategy requires an outcome variable that varies by collar, as do the training subject dummies. 32 Panel A of Table V presents estimates of (15) for the four training outcomes. In each case, the concentration measure is negatively related to computer skills provision and, in three of four cases, signi cantly so. The most substantial relationships are found for word processing and data entry training (the most prevalent computer skills offerings). As would be expected, larger establishments are more likely to offer skills training. Interestingly, despite the substantial (negative) correlation between concentration and market size (r ' 2 .80 in each collar), MSA-collar THS employment is estimated to have no signi cant impact on training propensity in these models. 33 Paralleling the wage estimates, Panel B of Table V presents xed effects estimates of the training probability models. Because these models control for each rm's average propensity to train, they provide a check on the possibility that the pooled results are driven by the differential presence of multiregion, high training-propensity rms in large competitive markets. These xed effects estimates prove quite comparable to the pooled results in Panel A. Appar-32. The empirical strategy differs from the theory in one dimension. While the model predicts that added competition will shift the intensive margin of training, the empirical work explores its impact on the extensive margin. A practical explanation for the substitution is that the data speak only to the prevalence of training and not its depth. More substantively, the model's prediction of movement along only one margin is an artifact of the simplifying assumption of two discrete skill groups, implying a constant "take-up" rate. If one posits a continuous ability distribution, it is readily seen that greater depth of training implies that the participation constraint (5) is satis ed for workers lower in the distribution, leading a greater fraction to prefer training.
33. Models that exclude the Her ndahl nd a signi cant positive impact of MSA-collar THS employment on training prevalence. ently, even among establishments belonging to the same rm, training provision is quite sensitive to local market conditions.
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B. Magnitudes and Speci cation Tests
The estimated impact of concentration on training is of meaningful economic magnitude. Taking the example of wordprocessing training, a one standard deviation increase in market competition is predicted to increase training prevalence by nine percentage points. A movement from the most to the least concentrated market would increase training prevalence by a sizable 38 percentage points. Using the overall training frequencies found in Table I , this impact translates into an elasticity at the sample mean of 2 0.15. The comparable elasticity for data entry training is 2 0.23 and for any computer skills training is 2 0.09.
Because the "difference-in-difference " estimates above are necessarily somewhat restrictive, I also provide in Appendix 1 estimates of the impact of concentration on training propensity performed separately by collar and excluding (by necessity) MSA xed effects. Unlike the earlier models, these "difference" estimates identify the concentration-training relationship using exclusively intermarket variation in concentration. Although their precision is substantially reduced by exclusion of MSA xed effects, these estimates con rm that a negative training-concentration relationship obtains for all training outcomes and collars.
OLS models were also estimated using the log of the Her ndahl measure, yielding smaller elasticities and weaker while still signi cant t-statistics. A quadratic Her ndahl term was never signi cant. Models that include the local MSA-collar unemployment rate as an alternative measure of the degree of competition in the local labor market generally nd a positive but insignicant impact of local unemployment on rms' training propensity. 34 Along with further detailed speci cation tests, Autor [2000b] also provides instrumental variables estimates of equation ( 
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS THS rms supply labor). 3 5 These IV models provide comparable estimates to those above.
To summarize, THS establishments are more likely to provide skills training in markets where competition is more strenuous. These facts are consistent with the model. An alternative reading, however, is that skills training is primarily a nonwage bene t like paid vacation that rms offer as competitive conditions demand. To distinguish the paper's monopsony model from this alternative hypothesis, it is necessary to ask whether training and nontraining rms respond differentially to competition. The nal empirical section performs this test.
VI. THE IMPACT OF MARKET CONCENTRATION ON WAGES
A distinct prediction of the present model is that because competition induces rms to provide additional productive training, competition yields larger wage gains for workers at training than at nontraining establishments. To examine this implication, I estimate wage equations similar to (12) augmented with the MSA-collar Her ndahl measure. These estimates explore rst, whether earnings of THS workers rise with competition in the THS marketplace, and second, whether earnings gains are greater for workers at training establishments.
A. Estimation
Estimates of these models are found in Table VI . The estimate in column (1) indicates that wages at THS establishments are on average higher in more competitive THS markets. This differential is not statistically signi cant, however. Column (2) replaces the Her ndahl main effect with two interactions: Her ndahl times training-provided and Her ndahl times no-training-provided. Consistent with the theoretical model, the point estimates for the wageconcentration elasticity appear substantially greater at training than at nontraining establishments. The data do not reject the null hypothesis of equality between the two coef cients, however. The subsequent column adds additional controls for THS establishment size and MSA-occupation market size. These controls do not change the 35. If there is a minimum ef cient scale to operating a THS establishment, markets with greater potential demand for THS services will also intrinsically have lower THS concentration. Figure 2 of Autor [2000b] demonstrates that this relationship is quite apparent in the data. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses account for correlation of errors within MSA-collar cells. All models are weighted by OCS regional establishment probability sampling weights and include 103 MSA dummies and 8 occupation dummies. Pooled estimates include workers at 1002 establishments. Fixed-effects estimates are limited to workers employed by multiregion rms (50 rms, 395 establishments).
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS qualitative pattern of results but do leave the Her ndahl-training interactions insigni cant. Fixed effects estimates of these models prove substantially more robust. The noninteracted speci cation, column (4), nds a substantial direct impact of market concentration on wages. A standard deviation increase in competition is predicted to raise wages by 8.9 log points. The subsequent two speci cations, which interact the Her ndahl measure with training and nontraining policies, demonstrate that this impact is signi cantly larger at training establishments.
To gauge the magnitudes of these impacts, note rst that the "training provided" dummy in the regression models is approximately equal to zero. Hence, the estimates imply that in a fully nonconcentrated market (Her ndahl equal to zero), there would be no wage differential between training and nontraining establishments. At the sample mean of the Her ndahl, however, training establishments will pay approximately ve percentage points less than nontraining establishments. A standard deviation increase in concentration causes this gap to grow by an additional 6.6 log points.
To ensure that the estimates are not driven by functional form or white-collar/nonwhite-collar differences, models were also estimated using a log Her ndahl measure and excluding white-collar observations. These speci cation tests yielded comparable results. Instrumental variables estimates found in Autor [2000b] also conrm these patterns. Models were also estimated including the MSAcollar unemployment rate as an additional measure of market competition. While imprecise, these estimates nd that a decline in the local unemployment rate appears to increase wages for THS workers at training establishments by more than at nontraining establishments. 36 The survey conducted by ALM provides a nal source of con rmatory evidence. THS managers were asked, "Hypothetically, let's say that conditions in your local temporary market got tougher because several competing of ces opened nearby. How likely are you to take the following steps?" A large majority of respondents was likely to "increase wages" (68 percent) or "offer more attractive training opportunities" (62 percent). By contrast, only a minority was likely to "increase vacation, holiday or sick bene ts" (33 percent) or to "reduce quali cations required for hire" (15 percent). Notably, the fraction likely to increase wages was 23 percent greater ( p , .05) at training establishments than at nontraining establishments.
While these results are consistent with the theoretical model's monopsony framework, perhaps a more direct test is simply to ask whether the wage markup that training establishments command is higher than that at nontraining establishments. 3 7 Establishments surveyed by ALM were asked to report their typical wage markup on assignments within their major occupation. A regression of their responses on occupation and MSA main effects and a variable indicating whether or not the establishment provides up-front skills training yields the following estimate (standard errors are in parentheses): Apparently, within the same occupations and MSAs, training establishments command a wage markup that exceeds that at nontraining by 5.5 percentage points (12 percent). Given the earlier evidence that training establishments pay lower wages yet screen for workers of higher quality, this nding does suggest that training establishments hold some degree of monopsony power.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper makes two contributions. The rst is to propose and test a model in which rms offer skills training to induce selfselection and perform screening of high ability workers. The idea advanced by the model that skills training may serve as an information elicitation mechanism is not at odds with the canonical view of training as a human capital investment. In fact, the proposed model relies on the assumption that training is productive, and 37. This markup should be distinguished from the parameter p in the model. In the model, p does not differ between training and nontraining rms. However, the difference between wages and the client bill rate is strictly higher at training rms. See equation (8).
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS differentially so with workers of higher ability. The key distinction is that in the competitive human capital model, workers pay ex ante or contemporaneously for general training, whereas in the framework explored here, training is given up front while training costs and returns are shared ex post by worker and rm.
While the notion that private information may induce employers to pay for general skills training has received considerable theoretical attention, empirical evidence has proved elusive. In part, this is because information-based models, which intrinsically depend on unobservable quantities, are notoriously difcult to test. This problem is compounded in the training context because, as the human capital model underscores, it is typically not feasible to discern how the costs and bene ts of on-the-job skills training are allocated between worker and rm. This paper resolves this set of ambiguities by studying training in a setting in which it is demonstrably clear that employers do pay the up-front costs of general skills training. Hence, the question explored here is not whether rms pay for general skills training but why they pay for general skills training. The evidence above suggests that private information is indeed a central explanation, at least in the case of temporary help rms.
The second contribution of the paper is to suggest an answer to a puzzle raised by many analysts of U. S. and European labor markets: what speci cally is the service that THS rms provide for which demand is growing so rapidly? 38 The model and empirical analysis above demonstrate that beyond providing exible spot market labor, THS rms gather and sell information about worker quality to their clients. Consistent with this view, recent survey data indicate that employers increasingly use THS arrangements to screen workers for permanent employment. Indeed, in some sectors, THS rms have become the primary conduit for auditioning and hiring new workers. 39 While numerous researchers have attributed the dramatic growth of THS employment to increasing employer desire for exibility, this appears not to be the entire explanation. The growing role of THS as a labor market information broker implies that the demand for worker screening is rising.
38. See, for example, Katz and Krueger [1999] , OECD [1999] , Segal and Sullivan [1997a] , and U. S. Department of Labor [1995, 1999] .
39. See, for example, Ballantine and Ferguson [1999] , Houseman [1997] , and U. S. Department of Labor [1999] . Huber-White standard errors in parentheses account for correlation of errors within MSAs (103). Models are weighted by OCS national establishment probability weights and include establishmen t occupational share measures within collars: 2 in white-collar, 1 in clerical/sales, and 3 in blue-collar.
1446
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
